NIAMEY/WASHINGTON (Reuters)
- A month after an Islamist ambush in Niger killed eight U.S. and Nigerien
troops, the two sides' officials still cannot agree on the sequence of events
leading to the incident or even, possibly more importantly, on the nature of
the mission itself.
Four soldiers from each nation
were killed when a joint patrol was attacked on Oct. 4 by dozens of militants
with machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades.
The incident drew attention to
the little-known U.S. military presence in Niger at a time when many Americans
are weary of U.S. involvement in conflicts abroad and Nigeriens are chafing at
the growing presence of foreign troops on their soil.
The United States has 800
soldiers operating in the largely desert West African nation, more than France,
which has 4,000 in the wider Sahel trying to tackle Islamist militancy. The
main U.S. base in Africa is in Djibouti, which supports about 4,000 personnel.
A Pentagon investigation into
the incident, led by a two-star general from U.S. Africa Command, may take
weeks. The Pentagon says it has not settled on any final version of events.
Through interviews in Niger's
capital Niamey and Washington, Reuters has tried to piece together the events
of Oct. 3 to Oct. 6, when the last U.S. soldier's body was recovered.
Accounts by Nigerien and
American officials differ over the mission's objectives, and whether and how
they may have changed.
The one consistent thread is
that they appear to have been woefully unprepared for their enemy.
"CONSIDERED SAFE"
U.S. and Niger officials agree
that on Oct. 3, 12 U.S. Special Forces and 30 Nigeriens left Niamey and headed
north to the Mali border. Twenty six similar patrols had taken place in the
area in the past six months without enemy contact, the Pentagon said.
After that, the stories of the two sides diverge.
"It was an intelligence
mission but also a mission of an operational nature," Niger Interior
Minister Mohammed Bazoum told Reuters in an interview. "It was in a zone
that was considered safe, not enemy territory."
Specifically, the mission aimed
to detain and question a suspected recruiter for Islamic State in the Greater
Sahara, an Islamic State affiliate, according to a senior Nigerien security
source with knowledge of the operation and two mid-level government sources,
all of whom declined to be named.
The senior source said the
mission was thought low enough risk that they had no armoured vehicles or body
armour.
U.S. officials vehemently contradict this account.
"The service members
involved in this unfortunate incident were unequivocally not directed to do a
'kill or capture mission'. They were on a reconnaissance mission," the
Pentagon said in statement sent to Reuters on Thursday. It said it would
provide more details once the investigation is complete.
All three Nigerien sources said
the target was a mid-ranking commander called Doundou Chefou who was recruiting
disgruntled youths from the Fulani ethnic group along Niger-Mali border.
Chefou commanded Islamic State
fighters affiliated to the movement led by an Arabic-speaking north African
called Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi, the Nigerien sources said.
According to the senior Nigerien
security official, the team initially sought Chefou out near a remote border
village on Oct. 3. They found a militant camp there but no fighters, he said.
After that, Nigerien
intelligence officials on the team received fresh orders from their
headquarters to pursue him in the village of Tongo Tongo, so they stayed the
night nearby, the official said.
Three U.S. officials, speaking
on condition of anonymity, said that while it is true the team was given an
additional task mid-mission, it was never in pursuit of a militant.
SECOND TEAM
The U.S. officials said their
soldiers were asked to work with the Nigerien troops to be on standby to help a
second U.S. military team whose mission was indeed to pursue a militant. That
mission was called off, however. It is unclear when or why.
"Did the mission change?
That's one of the questions being asked. I can't tell you definitively the
answer to that question," General Joseph Dunford, chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, said last month.
The U.S. officials said the
first team was asked to gather intelligence on the militant. The Americans
could do this under U.S. military rules of engagement that allow American
forces to accompany partner forces only when the chances of enemy contact are
"unlikely."
Asked about the existence of a
second mission, none of the Nigerien sources were aware of it.
U.S. and Nigerien officials
agree the team was ambushed after they met local leaders in Tongo Tongo on Oct.
4.
One of the Nigerien government
sources said the militants first came with just a few gunmen with AK47s on
motorbikes to slow them down, and later brought out heavier 12.7mm machine
guns, sniper rifles and rocket-propelled grenades.
That might explain why the team
took an hour to call for help - one of the issues that has most disturbed
senior Pentagon officials - because the initial attack may have only involved
light arms.
A few minutes after the team
called for air support, a surveillance drone appeared, providing a live feed,
but it took another hour before French military aircraft arrived. They were
unable to drop bombs because of how close the fighting was, diplomatic sources
have said.
One U.S. official said at least
some of the four U.S. soldiers killed were then separated from the convoy. They
included Sergeant La David T. Johnson, whose body was not recovered for two
days. It is unclear why.
U.S. PRESENCE LIKELY TO GROW
It is unlikely the United States
will back away from Niger because of its central location in the Sahel and
because of the proliferation of militant groups around it, including Nigeria's
Islamic State-linked Boko Haram and al-Qaeda affiliates.
Several current and former U.S.
officials with Africa experience said they expected U.S. military focus on the
Sahel to grow, not decrease.
Retired general Donald Bolduc,
who led U.S. special operations in Africa until June, said the military should
retain a small "footprint" in Africa but needed more intelligence and
surveillance resources and medical and air support.
While the most assets have gone
to the Middle East and Afghanistan, "there needs to be ... a different
perspective on how we allocate the resources between theatres," he said.
He expressed surprise at the
idea that the unit which was ambushed had been redirected to focus on a
militant leader.
Senior militant leaders are
normally well protected, Bolduc said, with rings of security guards and layers
of militants who communicate with one another via radio.
"I'm as confused about it
as you are," he said. "That's not how it's done. ... The resources
and planning didn't seem to be there for that kind of operation."
(Additional reporting by David
Lewis in Nairobi, Moussa Aksar in Niamey, Warren Strobel and Yara Bayoumy in
Washington; Editing by Sonya Hepinstall)
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